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ABSTRACT 
For my senior project, T chose to do an investigation on topside journal entries. Topside 
journal entries are adjusting entries made by a parent company to the books of its subsidiaries when 
preparing consolidated financial statements. Topside journal entries are a normal and necessary part 
of accounting. For instance, topside journal entries can be used to allocate income or expenses from a 
parent company to its subsidiaries. Such practice falls within the scope ofGAAP. Due to their 
relative ease of concealment, however, topside journal entries have often been used to perpetrate fraud 
as well by increasing revenues and decreasing expenses with no valid basis under GAAP. Topside 
journal entries are most frequently used in fraud when management is under high pressure to conform 
its financial statements to earnings expectations. Fraudulent misuse of topside journal entries is also 
common in companies undergoing mergers, acquisitions, or restructuring. 
Cendant Corporation and Symbol Technologies, Inc. are two companies whose managers 
were guilty of using topside journal entries fraudulently to boost financial statement information. 
While the specific methods offraud were slightly different, the underlying motives and strategies for 
committing the respective frauds were striking similar. AU 316 states that three conditions must exist 
in order for fraud to occur: 1) Management is under pressure or has an incentive to commit fraud, 2) 
An opportunity to perpetrate fraud exists, and 3) Perpetrators can rationalize committing fraud. All 
three conditions were present in the two aforementioned cases. 
While the fraudulent misuse of topside journal entries might not seem like fraud to some at 
first impression, it is important to realize that reclassifying real expenses (which are costs incurred to 
earn past revenues) to assets (which have future value and should generate future revenues) misleads 
readers of financial statements and is illegal. Such activity promotes a false sense of security among 
investors and leads to inflated valuation for companies. Furthermore, creating false receivables or 
booking false transactions is illegal for obvious reasons. Therefore, when examined closely, it is easy 
to see how such misuse of topside journal entries can result in substantial acts of fraud. 
USING TOPSIDE JOURNAL ENTRIES TO CONCEAL FRAUD 
In light of recent fraud cases that have plagued business, managers have been 
forced to realize the importance of the auditing profession now more than ever. In turn, 
auditors have been forced to reexamine their own profession in order to ensure that their 
services adequately comply with the needs of their clients. With the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers and auditors alike have been required to change several 
procedures in their respective professions. Aside from legal decrees, however, 
understanding past occurrences of fraud and recognizing them in the future is now of 
utmost importance to auditors. 
An alarming phenomenon in accounting in recent years has been the misuse of 
topside journal entries to perpetrate fraud . Perhaps even more alarming is the failure of 
the auditing profession as a whole to adequately address this issue. Topside journal 
entries are adjusting entries made by a parent company to the accounting records of its 
subsidiaries when preparing consolidated fmancial statements. Managers can 
legitimately use topside journal entries for such tasks as allocating expenses (e.g. 
technology cost, interest expense) and income (e.g. sales, miscellaneous income) from a 
parent company to its subsidiaries. Such journal entries are normal entries in the course 
of business and fall completely within the scope of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Due to the relative ease of concealment, however, managers have 
repeatedly used topside journal entries to perpetrate extensive frauds. 
AU 316 
AU 316 states that three conditions must exist in order for fraud to occur: 1) 
Management is under pressure or has an incentive to commit fraud, 2) An opportunity to 
perpetrate fraud exists, and 3) Perpetrators can rationalize committing fraud. Recently, 
managers at two separate companies, Cendant Corporation and Symbol Technologies, 
Inc., were under intense pressure to ensure that quarterly financial results met Wall Street 
analysts' expectations. As a result of such burdens, managers at these companies were 
able to rationalize committing frauds in order to achieve the desired outcomes on their 
respective financial statements. Managers at both Cendant and Symbol fraudulently 
misused topside journal entries to inflate financial statement infonnation. Thus, the cases 
of Cendant and Symbol provide prime examples of how managers can use topside journal 
entries to engage in substantial acts of fraud. 
FRAUD AT CENDANT CORPORATION 
Cendant merged with another company in December 1997. Before the merger, 
Cendant had established a merger reserve to account for anticipated costs related to the 
upcoming merger. Managers at Cendant used the pooling-of-interests method of 
accounting to establish the merger reserve and to account for the merger in 1997. This 
method of accounting, pennitted by GAAP at the time, consists of recording certain 
anticipated costs as liabilities prior to actually incurring these costs. In the case of 
Cendant, managers did use the merger reserve to record future liabilities related to the 
merger, but they frequently manipulated this accoWlt through the misuse of topside 
journal entries. Furthennore, managers used another reserve account, the membership 
cancellation reserve, in a similar manner to carry out their fraudulent activities. 
The fraud took place from the years 1995 through 1997. As is the trend with most 
frauds, managers at Cendant were continually forced to make larger topside adjustments 
as time progressed in order to inflate annual earnings to expected levels. By the time the 
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fraud was discovered and Cendant was forced to make a public announcement 
concerning the fraud, managers at Cendant had overstated the company's operating 
income for the three-year period by hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The problem occurred when managers at Cendant began to routinely overstate 
restructuring charges in order to increase the merger reserve. Managers also frequently 
increased the merger reserve by writing off assets they characterized as impaired (as a 
result ofthe merger) when, in reality, most of these assets were not impaired. Managers 
would then use the merger reserve to offset normal operating expenses, a process not 
acceptable under GAAP. In essence, Cendant created its merger reserve with the intent 
to use the account not only to record anticipated costs related to the merger, but to 
fraudulently offset operating expenses unrelated to the merger as well. Using topside 
journal entries to accomplish this scheme, managers at Cendant were able to improperly 
manage earnings during the three-year period and had intentions to continue their actions. 
The auditors of Cendant were also unwise in certain actions of their own 
regarding management's misuse of the merger reserve. For instance, auditors provided 
accounting advice to Cendant's managers concerning costs that are typical in corporate 
restructurings. Unfortunately, such costs are often subjective in nature and difficult to 
test. These costs require auditors to rely more heavily on managers' representations than 
on specific audit evidence. Managers at Cendant were able to use the subjective nature of 
these costs to conceal various expenses through the misuse of topside journal entries. 
Auditors also failed to recognize various other actions of management that did not 
conform to GAAP. For instance, managers provided the auditors ofCendant with 
contradictory drafts of schedules when the auditors requested support for the 
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establishment of the merger reserve. Managers continually revised these schedules to 
satisfy the auditors' questions or to incorporate new information discovered by the 
auditors. The schedules, however, were inconsistent with regard to the nature and 
amount of the individual components of the reserve. Auditors repeatedly relied on these 
ever-changing representations of management, in part due to the aforementioned 
subjectivity, and therefore were unable to detect the fraud. 
Managers at Cendant manipulated another reserve account, the membership 
cancellation reserve, to inflate earnings as well. Managers created the membership 
cancellation reserve to account for members who canceled during their membership 
periods (and were therefore entitled to refunds) as well as members who were billed for 
memberships but never paid for them (essentially, bad debts). When members paid for 
their memberships, typically with credit cards, managers at Cendant would record an 
increase in both the revenue and cash accounts at the time the credit cards were charged. 
Issuers of members' credit cards would frequently reject these charges, however, on a 
monthly basis. Therefore, Cendant would not receive the rejected charges as payments. 
When confronted by auditors on this issue, managers falsely claimed that once 
they resubmitted these rejections to banks, Cendant would ultimately collect nearly all 
rejections within a three-month period. Furthermore, managers falsely claimed that they 
recorded a reduction in the cash account and a decrease to the membership cancellation 
reserve for each of the few uncollected rejections. At the end of each accounting period 
during the course of the fraud, however, managers failed to record three months of 
rejections. In other words, managers neither reduced the cash account nor decreased the 
membership cancellation reserve for the corresponding amounts of the rejections. 
4 
Managers at Cendant errantly reasoned that they did not need to record rejections that 
occurred during the final three months of the year because they would collect most of the 
rejections within a three-month period of the initial rejection. 
The three months of withheld rejections created a temporary difference at the end 
of the year between the cash balance reflected on Cendant's general ledger and the cash 
balance reported on its bank statements. Managers falsely claimed that the difference 
between the general ledger balance and the bank statement balance did not reflect an 
overstatement of the cash account nor an understatement in the membership cancellation 
reserve since most rejections would eventually be collected. In reality, however, Cendant 
never collected the majority of the rejections. By not recording these rejections during 
the final three months of the year, managers at Cendant drastically understated the 
membership cancellation reserve and overstated the cash balance. Therefore, managers 
were able to avoid the expense charges and journal entries necessary to rectify the 
membership cancellation reserve and cash accounts. As was the case with the merger 
reserve, auditors of Cendant relied primarily on managers' representations with respect to 
the membership cancellation reserve and the company's "successful" collection history. 
FRAUD AT SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Unfortunately, Cendant is not the only company whose managers have been 
guilty of misusing topside journal entries to perpetrate a sizeable fraud. Managers at 
Symbol Technologies, Inc. also used topside journal entries to perpetrate fraud, and the 
similarities between what occurred at Cendant and Symbol are striking. From 1998-
2002, managers at Symbol perpetrated a fraud that inflated the reported fmancial results 
of their company. Managers manipulated reserves and made various improper topside 
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adjustments to ensure that the financial data of Symbol complied with market 
expectations. 
Managers made dozens of topside journal entries to the accounting records of 
Symbol that boosted net income and various other financial data by tens of millions of 
dollars. Throughout the duration of the fraud, managers at Symbol prepared what they 
called tango sheets. Tango sheets were schedules that compared the results of each 
quarter to market expectations. Included in the tango sheets were proposed topside 
adjustments to reserves and various other accounts that would better reflect market 
expectations. Such topside adjustments lacked valid support and were in gross violation 
of GAAP. When making the topside journal entries required to create such improper 
adjustments, managers knew that the results were already inflated due to fraudulent 
revenue recognition and other similar misconduct. Clearly, the misuse of topside journal 
entries played a substantial role in the perpetration of this fraud. 
Throughout the course of the fraud, managers at Symbol met in closing meetings 
during which they reviewed each division's results within the company. At the 
conclusion of these meetings, managers prepared consolidated financial statements 
consisting of the raw results obtained by the company. Managers then proposed specific 
topside journal entries based on the accounting "risks and opportunities" presented each 
quarter. After discussing the necessary topside journal entries, managers posted the 
entries to the general ledger without public disclosure. As a result of these topside 
journal entries, managers at Symbol understated expenses and overstated revenues and 
earrungs. 
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Symbol was a company that was driven by its financial nwnbers, particularly 
during the course of the fraud . The primary responsibility of managers was to ensure that 
the company's financial data met market expectations. Therefore, based on AU 316, the 
occurrence of fraud at Symbol is not surprising. Managers' response to these pressures 
was to create a fraudulent scheme that would create the illusion that Symbol had met or 
exceeded all market expectations. This scheme resulted in nwnerous misstatements of 
vital financial infonnation and consisted of blatant disregard for the policies outlined in 
GAAP. 
Similar to Cendant, reserves (often tenned "cookie jar" reserves by managers at 
Symbol), coupled with fraudulent misuse oftopside journal entries, were of central 
importance to the perpetration of this fraud. Symbol maintained a credit memo reserve to 
account for product returns from customers. Increases to this reserve decreased revenues 
by the corresponding amounts. When calculating this reserve, however, managers at 
Symbol did not do so in accordance with GAAP. Instead, managers set the reserve at a 
desirable level to achieve specific revenue targets. In effect, managers increased the 
reserve in increments lower than those required by GAAP, which in turn led to a material 
misstatement of revenues for the related accounting periods. 
When making increases to the credit memo reserve, managers simultaneously 
created a negative effect on both the cost of goods sold and inventory accounts, which in 
turn decreased gross profit. To lessen the effect such increases had on gross profit, 
managers at Symbol made additional fraudulent topside journal entries to the credit 
memo reserve that left the reported revenues unchanged while still improving the 
reported gross profit. Such adjustments were unfounded in GAAP and were made by 
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managers solely to present the appearance that Symbol had achieved the gross profit 
expected by the market. 
Managers at Symbol also created an excessive reserve for obsolete inventory in a 
gross inventory account maintained by the company's operations division. This "cookie 
jar" reserve was designed to account for obsolete inventory, but in reality it was used to 
help the operations division meet quarterly expectations. The reserve was beyond any 
reasonable estimate of the company's exposure for obsolete inventory, and managers at 
Symbol made topside journal entries to this account in order to significantly distort 
reported earnings. 
Symbol also offered a retirement plan to its senior executives and made annual 
contributions to the plan. In accordance with GAAP, Symbol created a reserve to 
account for the expenses associated with the annual contributions. During the time 
period in which the fraud occurred, some senior executives elected not to receive these 
benefits in lieu of other benefits offered by the company. Therefore, Symbol was no 
longer obligated to make annual contributions to the retirement plan for the benefit of 
those senior executives who had opted out of the plan. Even more importantly, Symbol 
was no longer obligated to pay retirement benefits to these senior executives. 
With these obligations erased, Symbol was left with millions of dollars in excess 
in the retirement plan reserve. Under such circumstances, GAAP requires managers to 
establish a schedule for the periodic release of these reserves into earnings. Managers at 
Symbol, however, chose to fraudulently use topside journal entries to release the 
unneeded funds in the retirement plan reserve during quarters where the raw financial 
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results fell short of market expectations. Doing so allowed managers to fraudulently 
boost earnings when needed, again without proper disclosure. 
One year during the course of the fraud, Symbol paid bonuses to its employees for 
work completed in the previous year. As a result, Symbol was obligated to pay the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) insurance during the quarter in which the 
bonuses were paid. GAAP requires the recognition of this expense in the quarter in 
which it is incurred. Managers at Symbol, however, chose to make topside adjustments 
that deferred the FICA insurance expense to a later accounting period in order to boost 
net income during the quarter in which the expense was incurred. 
At the end of the same year, Symbol owed and needed to account for more 
ordinary performance bonuses, as well as some nonrecurring bonuses related to a 
corporate acquisition. According to GAAP, ordinary performance bonuses are classified 
as operating expenses to be recognized in the quarter in which they are incurred. To 
reduce this adverse impact on operating expenses, managers at Symbol made improper 
topside journal entries to reclassify some of the ordinary performance bonuses. 
Managers reclassified the ordinary performance bonuses as nonrecurring bonuses related 
to the corporate acquisition, which are excluded from operating expenses. Such actions 
significantly jnflated net earnings for the related quarter. 
Finally, in order to manipulate the gross profit margin that managers reported for 
the related year, managers at Symbol reclassified numerous expenses from cost of goods 
sold to operating expenses through the misuse of topside journal entries. Such actions 
artificially boosted gross profit margin and enabled managers at Symbol to conceal that a 
recent drop in prices had eroded sales profits. 
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PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
As is evident in the two cases involving Cendant and Symbol, the fraudulent 
misuse of topside journal entries has been an alarming trend in recent years. This trend 
raises questions concerning the ability of auditors to detect such fraudulent activity. In 
the cases of Cendant and Symbol, very weak internal controls were in place. Therefore, 
auditors must ensure the existence and implementation of strong internal controls by 
company management. 
For instance, auditors should check for the existence of an internal audit 
department and should communicate regularly with those associated with the internal 
audit. Auditors should see that managers monitor and require authorization for all journal 
entries as well. Journal entries should be adequately supported and should accurately 
reflect the underlying events and transactions. Furthermore, auditors should familiarize 
themselves with company procedural manuals and make certain that managers enforce 
strict adherence to the procedures outlined in these manuals. Finally, auditors should 
take into account the process by which an entity prepares its financial statements and 
should ensure that proper controls are present in this process. Although collusion among 
managers can impede auditors' ability to detect fraudulent misuse of topside journal 
entries, management's failure to implement strong internal controls can often signal 
fraudulent activity. 
Aside from verifying that certain controls exist from management's perspective, 
auditors should make sure that they demonstrate a high degree of professional skepticism 
in their own work. They should design audits to closely examine irregular adjustments 
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and journal entries, particularly topside journal entries that seem to have no basis in 
GAAP (topside journal entries involving reserve accounts are frequent red flags). 
Auditors should also compare revenues and expenses from previous accounting periods 
and note any sizeable differences between amounts from period to period. When 
selecting items to test, auditors should identify the population of journal entries and 
adjustments that affect financial statements. Finally, auditors should be conscious of 
management's expectations and be particularly skeptical if managers are under intense 
pressure to obtain lofty financial results. 
REESTABLISHMENT OF PROFESSION 
The accounting frauds of the last decade have damaged the reputation of what 
was once a highly trusted profession. Managers now must realize the importance of 
auditors in maintaining the credibility and reputation of their respective companies. 
Auditors must also realize the importance of their responsibility to ensure the credibility 
of both the clients they audit and the auditing profession itself. The fraudulent misuse of 
topside journal entries has become a huge problem in recent years, and it demands the 
attention of both managers and auditors alike. Although not all topside journal entries are 
fraudulent, managers, and particularly auditors, should be keenly aware of all topside 
journal entries and examine them closely. By paying closer attention to the use oftopside 
journal entries, both managers and auditors can contribute to the reestablishment of 
character and trust that was once prevalent in the accounting profession. 
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